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I. INTRODUCTION

Both the Florida courts and the state legislature spent a busy year
dealing with juvenile justice and child welfare issues. The Supreme Court of
Florida ruled on two significant matters. The first involved the reach of the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedurein criminal cases, and the second the
application of due process hearing rights to mental health residential
treatment placements of children who have been committed to the custody of
the Department of Children and Family Services as dependents.
The lower appellate courts continued more than a decade long process
of holding the trial courts strictly accountable for compliance with basic
constitutional principles of the right to counsel and statutory compliance in
juvenile delinquency settings. In addition, the intermediate appellate courts
faced an eclectic body of issues involving both the dependency and
termination of parental rights settings including, among other things,
questions of the rules for returning children to their natural parents.
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The legislature was also particularly active in the child welfare field. It
passed legislation putting in place a dramatic reformulation of the child
welfare system.
Seeking a new approach, the legislature placed
responsibility for child welfare services on private for-profit entities that
would contract with the Department of Children and Family Services.
I. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A.

Adjudicatory Issues

In juvenile law survey articles dating back a decade, this author has
discussed the trial court's failure to comply with the United States Supreme
Court's 1967 ruling in In re Gault, providing that juveniles have a right to
counsel in delinquency cases and if indigent, are entitled to an attorney paid
for by the state.2
The FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure and an extensive body of case3
law articulate the right to counsel and state the test for waiver of counsel.
Yet, as recorded case law demonstrates, the trial courts continue to misapply
the test for waiver of counsel. Thus, in A.G. v. State,4 a child waived counsel
at a dispositional hearing in which the appellate court found that there was
no determination that the child's waiver was knowing and voluntary as
provided by the FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure.5 Under Florida law, a
juvenile has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at all critical
stages of a delinquency proceeding.6 If there is a waiver, the court must
determine if it was freely and intelligently made.7 In the case at bar, the
court failed to advise the child of the nature of the rights he was waiving,
1.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2.
See id. at 36-42; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1998 Survey of FloridaLaw, 24
NOVA L. REV. 179, 185-86 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L. REv. 179, 188 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Survey];
Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of FloridaLaw, 20 NOVA L. REv. 191, 194-95
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida
Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 335, 342-45 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Survey]; Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NovA L. REv. 1169, 1179-80 (1991)
[hereinafter 1990 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, 1989 Survey of FloridaLaw: Juvenile Law, 14
NOVA L. REV. 859, 861-64 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Survey].
3.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.185; see 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 185 (discussing related
Florida cases); 1997 Survey, supra note 2, at 188 (addressing precisely the same topic).
4.
737 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
5. Id. at 1247; see FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.185.
6.
See A.G., 737 So. 2d at 1247.
7.
Id.
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that he understood the consequences of waiving legal representation, and
that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made.
Similarly in A.P. v. State,9 in a short opinion, the appellate court
reversed a trial court decision for failure to properly advise the child as to
the right to counsel.10 In that case, not only was there no written waiver of
counsel as required by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure," but the
court found there was no thorough inquiry into the child's comprehension of
the offer of counsel, nor a finding of the child's capacity to make the choice
to waive counsel intelligently and understandingly as required under the
13
2
FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure.1 This constituted fundamental error.
Sometimes, the trial court personnel cannot even seem to get the
document signing procedure correct. In M.A.F. v. State,14 the waiver of
counsel was signed by the child but the place designated for the parent was
left blank.15 In that case as well, there was a "failure to perform the
necessary colloquy" about the right to counsel and a question as to whether
the waiver of counsel
was freely and intelligently made.1 6 The appellate
17
reversed.
court thus
In testing whether the waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, the
courts include in the analysis an evaluation of the child's prior exposure to
the juvenile justice system and whether it would aid in the child's
comprehension of his or her rights. In T.S.D. v. State, 8 the appellate court
held that the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the waiver
of counsel was knowing and intelligent and specifically found that there was
no demonstration that the juvenile's prior exposure to the juvenile court
system would help in the comprehension of the right to counsel.' 9
In the author's experience, the process of advising juveniles of their
right to counsel in delinquency cases often takes place in a group setting
where a number of children are before the court waiting for their cases to be
8.
Id. at 1246. The plea colloquy was as follows: The judge asked, "'Okay. [A.G.],
the Department of Juvenile Justice has recommended a Level 6 commitment program for you.

Would you like to have a lawyer now?' A. G. responded, 'No, ma'am.'
9.
740 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
10. Id. at 1241.
11. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165(a).
12. A.P., 740 So. 2d at 1241; see FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165(b)(2).
13. A.P., 740 So. 2d at 1241.
14. 742 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
15.
16..
17.
18.
19.

Id.

Id. at 535.
Id.
Id.
741 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1143.
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heard. The issue of whether this is acceptable arose in B.F. v. State.20 The
child appeared with his parents at an initial detention hearing, held as part of
a group hearing.2 1 Some of the juveniles were present for arraignment
hearings, while others were present for detention hearings, and the judge
spoke to the entire group of youngsters explaining the nature of the hearing
and informing them of various rights including the right to counsel.
Subsequently, the child was called before the court and asked whether he
heard the speech given when he first came in. 23 On appeal from a plea, the
child claimed the court failed to adequately explain the right to counsel and
to determine the child knowingly and intelligently waived the right.2
The appellate court reversed, finding that while the arraignment
colloquy minimally informed the child that he had the right to counsel, the
trial court failed to make an individualized inquiry into the child's
comprehension of the right to counsel and the capacity to make a decision to
waive counsel in an intelligent and understanding fashion 25 Recognizing
that the generalized speech to a group of youngsters might not be enough,
the appellate court ruled that testing the knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel requires several steps including informing the juvenile of the
benefits that he would relinquish and the danger and disadvantages of
representing himself, determining whether the youngster's choice was
voluntarily and intelligently made, and determining whether there were any
unusual circumstances which might preclude the youngster from exercising
the right to represent himself.26
Florida, like other states, provides for both waiver of a juvenile to adult
court and certification as an adult. 27 This subject has been discussed on a
number of occasions in prior editions of this survey.' In State v. Brown,'
the circuit court certified a minor as an adult, despite his being seventeen
years of age at the time of the alleged offense. 30 He had previously been
adjudicated delinquent for possession of cocaine, which would have been a
20. 747 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
21. Id. at 1062.
22.

Id.

23. Id. at 1063-64.
24. Id. at 1064.
25. B.F., 747 So. 2d at 1065-66 (citing J.R.V. v. State, 715 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) and D.L. v. State, 719 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
26. Id. at 1065.
27. See FLA. STAT. § 985.226 (2000).
28. 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 185, 194-95; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues
in Floridain 1998, 23 NOvA L. REv. 819, 835-36 (1998) [hereinafter Juvenile Law Issues].

29.
30.

745 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1006.
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felony if committed as an adult. 31 The appellate court held that certification
as an adult did not end the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the
youngster's previous delinquent act. 32 The adult criminal law statute
provided certain exceptions to criminal court jurisdiction, those being: a
person convicted of a felony whose civil rights and final authority had been
restored, and a person who had committed a delinquent act but where the
jurisdiction over the delinquent act had expired.3 However, in the case at
bar, the child was a delinquent under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for
his prior delinquent act at the time he was charged with possession of a
firearm.4 Thus, the appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
State's information.3
Another issue involving the interplay of juvenile and adult criminal
36
court jurisdiction arose in Williams v. State. In that case, a juvenile was
charged as an adult for agravated battery, an offense which qualified for
direct filing in adult court. He was also charged with other offenses which
could have been heard in adult court together with the battery.3 8 The
question before the district court was whether, once the State entered a nolle
prosequi39 as to the battery offense, those other charges over which the adult
court did not have any independent jurisdiction could still be heard in adult
court.4 ° The appellate court answered in the negative.4 ' Commenting that
the issue was not, in its technical sense, one of subject matter jurisdiction
(because both juvenile and adult criminal courts are divisions of the circuit
court in Florida) the appellate court explained that the Supreme Court of
Florida, nonetheless, recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile
court in the absence of a statutory exception.42

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 1007.
FLA. STAT. § 790.23(2) (2000); see Brown, 745 So. 2d at 1007.
Brown, 745 So. 2d at 1007.
Id.

36.
37.

737 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1142.

38. Id.
39. "A formal entry upon the record, by the plaintiff in a civil suit, or, more
commonly, by the prosecuting attorney in a criminal action, by which he declares that he 'will
no further prosecute' the case, either as to some of the defendants, or altogether." BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990).
40. Williams, 737 So. 2d at 1141.
41. Id. at 1142.
42. Id. at 1141.
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The FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure contain a ninety-day speedy
trial rule.43 In juvenile cases, the time begins to run on the earlier of the date
44
the child is taken into custody or the date a delinquency petition is filed.
Should the hearing not commence within the ninety-day period the child can
move to dismiss based upon violation of the speedy trial rule.45 The
Supreme Court of Florida has held that the State may not refile charges
against a juvenile after the speedy trial rule has expired. 46 In D.A.J. v.
State,47 the State filed the initial petition 103 days after the child's arrest and
thirteen days after the speedy trial period had run.48 Thus, the court should
have granted the motion to dismiss.49 Furthermore, although the child failed
to file a written motion for discharge, the court held that Rule 8.090 of the
FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure,which requires written motions dealing
with the fifteen-day window of recapture, was irrelevant in this case because
the State failed to file the initial petition within the speedy51 trial period.50
Therefore, the appeal could be heard and the reversal ensued.
A final case involved the issue of the application of the FloridaRules of
Juvenile Procedureto a child who has been filed against in adult court. The
question in State v. Olivo5 2 was whether the adult speedy trial rule or the
juvenile speedy trial rule Aoverns when the State directly files against a
juvenile in the adult court. The supreme court held that the adult speedy
trial rule governs. "4
B.

DispositionalIssues

Probation, known until recently as "community control" in Florida, is
one of the dispositional alternatives in chapter 985 of the Florida Statutes
which has been recently described by one court as a "moderately complex
statute [that] allows for many different dispositions. '55 It has been the

43.

FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a).

44.

8.090(a)(1)-(2).

45. 8.090(d).
46. P.S. v. State, 658 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1995).
47. 754 So. 2d. 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

48
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id.
759 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 2000).
Id. at649.

54. Id. at 650.
55. T.J. v. State, 743 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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subject of substantial discussion in earlier surveys.5 6 In T.J. v. State,57 the
issue was whether the trial court was obligated to actually enter an order
citing the statutory requirement that community control end upon the child's
eighteenth birthday.58 The appellate court held that it was receding from
prior decisions which either held or suggested that the order must require a
statement that the community control end at age nineteen.5 9 The court held
that both the juvenile and the State are on legal notice of the content of

chapter 39 regarding termination of community control at the child's
nineteenth birthday and further that the form disposition order aproved by
the supreme court in 1987 did not contain the statutory language.
In an interesting opinion involving the agplication of the Miami Dade
County ordinance relating to spray painting, the Third District Court of
Appeal in State v. D.S.,

recently held that sentencing a juvenile to time

served in the detention center based upon a nolo contendere plea to
possessing spray paint cans complied with the ordinance provision for
punishment by a term in jail.63 Significantly, the court did not reach the
issue of the validity of the requirement that the juvenile disposition conform

to a plan for punishment contained in the ordinance as provided for in
section 806.13(7) of the FloridaStatutes." Raised, but not properly before

the appellate court, was the constitutional validity of a statute that placed
dispositional authority in the ordinance.6 In dicta, Chief Judge Schwartz
commented that it might be inappropriate to suggest that the court resist a
view of the law that interferes with the right and duty of the juvenile court to

render appropriate dispositions concerning a particular child and situation
before the court.6
56. See 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 183-85; Juvenile Law Issues, supra note 28, at
833-34, 841-44; 1997 Survey, supra note 2, at 195-97.
57. 743 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
58. Id. at 1159.
59. Id. at 1160 (citing C.D.D. v. State, 684 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1996);
C.P. v. State, 674 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); M.T.H. v. State, 676 So. 2d 77
(Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1996); M.V. v. State, 507 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1987)
and F.R. v. State, 473 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1985)).
60. T.J., 743 So. 2d at 1160.
61. The Third District Court of Appeal previously upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance in D.P. D.P. v. State, 705 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see Juvenile
Law Issues,supra note 28, at 819, 838-39.
62. 760 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
63. Id. at958.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 959.
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I1. DEPENDENCY
In recent years, the subject of grandparent visitation and custody rights
has been before the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Florida, and Florida's intermediate appellate courts. As the discussion in
this section of the article shows, parent and grandparent visitation issues
arise within dependency proceedings. Therefore, an analysis of the recent
appellate visitation decisions is germane to understanding their effect upon
dependency proceedings.
In the Spring of 2000, in a plurality opinion, the United States Supreme
Court decided Troxel v. Granville, a case involving the State of
Washington's grandparent visitation statute. 68 The Supreme Court held that
it need not reach the constitutional question of whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires all nonparental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a
condition precedent to granting visitation. 69 Because of the sweeping
breadth and application of unlimited power under the Washington statute,
the Supreme Court did not have to decide the narrower constitutional issue
of whether harm need be proven to order grandparent visitation. 70 It found
that the expansive Washington visitation statute was an unconstitutional
infringement on the parental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of children.7 1 Specifically, the Court held that under
Washington law the burden of disproving the visitation was on the parents,
and the Washington court gave no weight to the parents' assent to visitation
before the filing of a petition.7
Concluding that what happened in
Washington was a simple disagreement between the court and the parents
concerning the child's best interest, such a decision constituted an
unconstitutional infringement on the parents' basic decisionmaking rights."
In a series of cases beginning with Beagle v. Beagle,74 and presaging the
United States Supreme Court opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
effectively rejected the entire Florida grandparent visitation statute on
grounds that it violated the parents' right to privacy under Article I, section
67. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
68. Id. at 2057.
69. Id. at 2064.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2065.
72. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2062.
73. Id. at 2061.
74. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996) (holding that section 752.01(1)(a) of the Florida
Statutes governing visitation in context of families was unconstitutional).
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23 of the Florida Constitution.75 The court decided on the basis of the
Florida Constitution what the United States Supreme Court did not reach
under the United States Constitution, namely that family privacy precludes
court ordered grandparent visitation unless~a showing is made that somehow
lack of visitation will harm the child. 76
Despite these decisions, grandparent visitation and custody continue to
be issues in Florida's dependency and termination of parental fights cases.
Chapter 39 of the FloridaStatutes provides for grandparent visitation after a
child has been adjudicated dependent, and terminates visitation after the
child is returned to the physical custody of the other parent.7 7 In L.B. v.
C.A., 78 the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's dismissal
of the grandparents' petition for visitation in a dependency proceeding
because there were
no allegations of harm and the child had been reunited
79
with his mother.
In a second case, Powell v. Department of Children & Families,80 the
appellate court affirmed a trial court's denial of the grandparents'
application for unsupervised visitation with their dependent grandchildren.8 '
The trial court found a compelling reason not to allow the visitation in the
home of the grandparents because the children's father, who had been
arrested for kidnapping and domestic battery, had free access to the
grandparents' home, and thus the grandparents could not assure the safety of
the children.82
Finally, grandparent intervention also arises in the context of adoption.
Section 63.0425 of the Florida Statutes requires that a grandparent be
75. Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2000) (finding the grandparent visitation
statute was unconstitutional in the context of deceased parent); Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d
510 (Fla. 1998) (ruling the grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional in the context of
out-of-wedlock child); see also Lonon v. Ferrell, 739 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that in face of mother's objection, biological father's parents have no right to
visitation with child after biological father and mother divorce, mother remarries, and
biological father consents to child's adoption by stepfather).
76. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 515. In the 2000 Legislative Session Senator Campbell
unsuccessfully sought to amend the grandparent visitation statute, section 752.01 of the
FloridaStatutes, to require a showing of present or threatened significant mental or physical
harm as a result of the refusal to permit visitation. See Fla. S. Res. 288 (Fla. 2000).
77. FLA. STAT. § 39.509 (2000).
78. 738 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
79. Id. at 427. In LB., the court discussed section 39.4105 of the Florida Statutes.
Id. This section has since been renumbered § 39.509. See FLA. STAT. § 39.509 (2000).
80. 764 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
81. Id. at 632.
82. Id.
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provided with notice when the grandchild is placed for adoption if the child
83
lived with the grandparent for at least six months.
Previous juvenile law surveys have discussed the issue of parents using
a variety of procedures, including dependency proceedings, as tactical
devices to oust spouses, former spouses, and putative parents from
involvement with the child. 84 In LJ.R. v. T.T., 5 a natural father appealed a
final judgment granting a petition for adoption filed by the child's natural
mother.
The judgment of adoption had terminated the father's parental
rights.87 He was imprisoned at the time in Massachusetts.88 The court
recognized that a proceeding to terminate parental rights, while generally
brought by the Department of Children and Family Services, might be
brought pursuant to Florida law by any person with knowledge of the facts,
which would include a parent.89 However, the court concluded that the
parent could not go straight to the adoption process without complying with
the termination of parental rights provisions of Florida law. 9° Further, the
natural mother could not circumvent the statutory restrictions on terminating
retaining her own by petitioning for
the father's parental rights while
91
adoption as a single birth parent.
A significant issue of parents' custodial rights arose recently in the case
of Department of Children & Families v. Benway.92 The Department of
Children and Families appealed an order requirin it to send a dependent
child to live with his natural father in Vermont.9 Vermont officials had
disapproved of the placement, having been contacted by Florida state
officials it would appear, pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children ("ICPC"). 94 Because Vermont disapproved of the
placement, the Department of Children and Families appealed from the court
order which held that the child should be placed with the father irrespective
83. FA. STAT. § 63.0425(1) (2000); see In re X.Z.C., 747 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the "lived with" provision is unambiguous and only requires that
the child live with the grandparent for at least six months and not that the child resides solely
with the grandparents).
84. See 1995 Survey, supra note 2, at 208-09; 1992 Survey, supra note 2, at 369.
85. 739 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
86. Id. at 1284.
87.
88.

91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1285 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.461(1) (1997)).
LJ.R., 739 So. 2d at 1287.
Id.

92.
93.
94.

745 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 438.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 409.401, Art. IH (2000).

89.
90.
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of Vermont's disapproval. 95 The appellate court held that the ICPC is
applicable to an out-of-state placement of a dependent-child with a natural
parent, even though the statute makes no reference to a placement by a state
agency back with a natural parent.96 The statute does refer to the transfer of
a child "for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible
adoption." 97 The Florida court held, nonetheless, that the statute ought to be
liberally construed.98 The Fifth District also relied upon other state court
decisions and a law review article that suggest that the statute ought to be
interpreted to include placement of a child with natural parents.99 The
District Court of Appeal concluded that "[o]nce a court has legal custody of
a child, it would be negligent to relinquish that child to an out-of-state parent
without some indication that the parent is able to care for the child
appropriately."1 °°
Left undecided, indeed not even discussed in the Benway case, are the
questions of family privacy and parental rights constitutionally protected
10 1 and
under the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois,
the series of Florida cases dealing with parental privacy beginning with
Beagle v. Beagle.1°2 In a dependency proceeding, in the absence of a
showing of harm, and it may well be that harm could have been shown in the
Benway case, there is no constitutional basis for keeping a child from a
natural parent.1 3 To do otherwise is to deny the liberty and privacy
based
4
constitutional rights of natural parents recognized in these cases. 1
A second case, raising similar issues, is V.P. v. Departmentof Children
& Families.105 In V.P., a non-custodial parent residing in Illinois sought to
have the child, who was the subject of a dependency petition alleging abuse
and neglect by the child's mother and stepfather, temporarily placed with
hinm. 0 6 Instead, the trial court placed the child with a non-relative.10 7 The
95.
96.
97.
98.

Benway, 745 So. 2d at 438.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 409.401, Art. 11(a) (1997)).
Id.

99. Id. at 439 (citing Kimberly M. Butler, CHILD WELFARE-Outside the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children-Placementof a Child with a Natural Parent, 37

VML. L. REV. 896 (1991)).
100. Benway, 745 So. 2d at 439.
101. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
102. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
103. See id.at 1277.
104. See id. at 1275.

105. 746 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
106. Id. at 590.
107. Id.
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district court held that the trial court did not comply with chapter 39
provisions regarding temporary custody, noting that absent evidence and
findings that the temporary custody would endanger the safety, well-being,
and physical, mental, or emotional health of the child, the court should order
temporary placement of the child with the natural parent. 10
A third issue of parental custody arose in J.R. v. Department of
Children & Families.109 In J.R., a mother and stepfather were charged with
abusing their children." 0 At the detention hearing the natural father
requested custody of the minor children."' The court made no finding of2
facts pursuant to chapter 39, but simply placed the children in shelter care.1
Section 39.508(8) of the Florida Statutes requires that when a child is
removed from the custody of a parent, the court must determine whether
there is a parent with whom the child is not residing who desires to assume
custody of the child and that the child shall be placed with that parent
"unless it finds that such placement would endanger the safety, well-being,
or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child."'1 3 In the J.R. case, the
district court held that the lower court should at least have4 conducted a
hearing to determine the father's suitability under the statute."
These three cases demonstrate by their reference to the FloridaStatutes
that the failure to allow the parent to have custody of the child must be
premised upon a showing of endangering the safety of the child. Although
the appellate courts made no such reference, the statute and their
5 holdings
closely follow the Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois."
Concern for conditions in a Department of Children and Family
assessment center by a trial judge in Broward County generated an appellate
decision on the scope of the authority of the dependency court in
Departmentof Children & Family Services v. L C. 11 The issue arose from a
statutory court review of a dependency case in which the trial court learned
that the juvenile before the court, as well as others with disabilities who had
been rejected from various placements, were being brought to a particular
assessment center facility where they stayed until late at night without what
appeared to be appropriate placement supervision.117 The trial court ordered
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
745 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1059.
Id.
Id.
Id; FLA. STAT. § 39.508(8) (2000).
J.R., 745 So. 2d at 1059.
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
116. 742 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
117. Id. at 402.
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the agency to terminate the practice, as well as to produce the relevant
records of all the children who had recently been placed at the center.11 8 The
issue before the appellate court was one of division of responsibility between
the executive branch and the courts, and the degree to which the juvenile
court can act to protect children within its jurisdiction.1 9 The appellate
court affirmed in part requiring the agency to produce the names of the
children at the assessment center, but reversed the production of more
extensive records and the entry of an injunction against the agency
preventing children with disabilities in the judge's division from being held
in the center.12
Finally, and most significantly, in dicta the appellate court recognized
the severity of the problem of "the horrendous number of abused and
abandoned children, and the difficult caseloads of both the case workers and
the courts in juvenile proceedings. ' 2 The court then added:
What would help considerably is if each child could have a
guardian ad litem or attorney ad litem who could be in contact with
the child on a more regular basis and serve as the child's advocate.
Parents are represented in these proceedings, but the child, the
alleged object of everyone's concern, has no voice and no capacity
to reach the court in many cases. We commend the bar volunteer
of America, for their
projects such as Lawyers for the Children
122
representation of dependent children.
Further discussion of the Florida legislature's very limited effort to fund a
model program for the representation of children in dependency cases is
discussed later in this article.
In making determinations of dependency, Florida appellate courts
continue to apply and interpret the Supreme Court of Florida's 1991 decision
in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,123 in which
the court held that the prior termination of a parent's rights as to one child
supports the severing of the parent's rights as to another child.124 In M.F. v.
118. Id.
119. Id. at404.
120. Id. at 404-05.
121. I.M., 742 So. 2d at 406.
122. Id.
123. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
124. Id. at 571; see generally Juvenile Law Issues, supra note 28, at 825; Michael J.
Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REv. 333, 368-73 (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 Survey].
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Department of Children & Families,12 a father appealed from an order
adjudicating two minor children dependent following his conviction for
attempted sexual battery on a stepdaughter. 126 The appellate court
recognized that the abuse of one child can provide a cause for termination of
parental rights or adjudication of dependency as to a sibling if there is a
substantial likelihood of future abuse and neglect of the sibling if that child
were returned to the parent. 127 The issue in M.F. was whether the copy of
the father's conviction for sexual abuse of a stepchild, as the only evidence
presented to support an adjudication of dependency of the two siblings, was
adequate.'2 The court held it wa's. 129 The appellate court relied upon
professional literature showing that the act of sexual abuse itself provides
evidence of likelihood of sexual abuse of other children.'3 In so doing,
however, the court distanced itself from the Fifth District Court of Appeal
that required additional evidence
31 of the likelihood that the parent would
similarly abuse other children.'
Services to children who have been removed from their homes as a
result of a petition for dependency in Florida have been the subject of
Two class action lawsuits challenging
significant recent litigation.
conditions in the Florida foster care system are currently pending in the
federal courts. Ward v. Kearny 132 is a challenge to conditions in foster care
in Broward County. 133 That case was filed on October 20, 1998 and
conditionally certified as a class on March 17, 1999, with a settlement
agreement signed by the parties on January 26, 2000.134 The federal court
held a Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurefairness hearing on
125. 742 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
126. Id. at 491.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. M.F., 742 So. 2d at 491.
131. Id. (citing Eddy v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 704 So. 2d 734, 736 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Denson v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 661 So. 2d 934, 936
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); and Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 547 So. 2d
981, 984 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey
of FloridaLaw, 21 NOVA L. REv. 190, 216-17 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Survey].

132. Compl. at 1, Ward v. Feaver, (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 20, 1998) (No. 98-7137-Civ.)
(subsequently Kathleen Kearney, in her official capacity as Secretary of State, was substituted
as the named defendant in this case pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).

133. Compl. at 1, Ward (No. 98-7137-Civ.).
134. Settlement Agreement, Ward v. Kearney (S.D. Fla., filed Feb. 17, 2000) (No. 987137-Civ.).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/4

14

Dale: Juvenile Law

20001

Dale

May 31, 2000, and approved the settlement agreement. 135 A second case,
Thirty-One Foster Children v. Bush,1 36 filed on June 13, 2000, is also
presently pending in the federal district court for the Southern District of
Florida. 37" That case challenges foster care38throughout the state and makes
multiple constitutional and statutory claims.1
Another significant issue of out-of-home care in the dependency system
139
came before the Supreme Court of Florida this past year in M.W. v. Davis.
The issue in that case was whether, when a court orders a child to be placed
in a residential facility for mental health treatment after the child has been
committed to the local custody of the Department of Children and Families
in a dependency proceeding, the child must have an evidentiary hearing prior
to the court ordering
the temporary placement in the residential mental
4
health facility.1
The supreme court analyzed whether the reuirements of Florida's civil
commitment statute, known as the Baker Act,14 are incorporated into the
laws regulating dependency proceedings. 142 The court held that neither the
requirements of chapter 39 nor the Florida Constitution mandates an
evidentiary hearing that complies with the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Baker Act prior to a dependent child being ordered by
the court into a residential mental health facility.' 43 In making its
constitutional ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida relied on Parham v.
JR.,'" the 1979 opinion in which the United States Supreme Court set out
the constitutional due process procedural standards necessary when a child is
committed by a parent voluntarily, or by a state agency when the child is in
the custody of the state, into a state mental hospital. The Parhamcourt,
according to the Supreme Court of Florida, set three minimum due process
standards to be met when a child is committed including an inquiry by a
neutral fact finder, albeit not in a form of a judicial inquiry, an inquiry to
probe the child's background using available resources, and a periodic
135. Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Ward v. Kearney (S.D. Fla. May 31,

2000) (No. 98-7137-Civ.).
136. Amended Compl., Thirty-One Foster Children v. Bush, (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 28,
2000) (No. 00-2116-Civ.).

137. Id.
138. Id. at 2-3.

139. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
140. Id. at 92.
141. FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2000).
142. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 92.

143. Id.
144. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
145. Id.; see M.W., 756 So. 2d at 99.
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review by a neutral fact finder.' 46 Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida held
implicitly that a prior due process evidentiary hearing was not
constitutionally required. 47 The child argued alternatively that the Florida
Statutes provided more rights than the minimum federal constitutional
procedures.
After detailed review of chapter 39, the court concluded that
the legislature did not intend the Baker Act to apply to children who had
been adjudicated dependent and placed in the temporary legal custody of the
Department of Children and Family Services. 149
Finally, the court looked at the question of what procedures should
apply before the court orders a dependent child to be placed in a residential
psychiatric facility against the child's wishes. 150 Initially, the court
recognized that chapter 39 provides that there shall be judicial and other
procedures to assure due process for children in the form of fair hearings that
recogmze, protect, and enforce children's constitutional and other legal
rights.
The court then expressed concern that while the procedures in the
statute might be construed to require a precommitment hearing, the statute
does not adequately address a number of significant issues including whether
there ought to be an appointment of an attorney for the child before
commitment, the type of hearing required, the standard of proof to apply,
and whether the child should have the right to put on evidence before
placement in the psychiatric facility. 152 The decision to place a child in a
psychiatric facility must be included in the case plan developed in the course
of the dependency proceeding. 153 However, the court also concluded that an
order that approves the placement of a dependent child in a locked
residential facility against that child's wishes deprives a child of liberty and
thus makes obligatory clear cut procedures to be followed by the dependency
judge. 154 Such procedures, the court55 opined, do not appear to exist in the
FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure.
Then, in forceful language, the court pointed to its concern that while
the various parties and actors in the proceeding would be acting in the
child's best interest, nonetheless, the child might not perceive that anyone
had his or her best interest at heart when the child was placed in a locked
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

M. W., 756 So. 2d at 99.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 105.
Id.
M.W., 756 So. 2d at 106 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)() (2000)).
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
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psychiatric facility against his or her wishes without an opportunity to be
heard. 156 The court stated, "Indeed, the issue presented by this case extends
beyond the legal question of what process is due; rather, this case also
presents the question of whether a child believes that he or she is being
listened to and that his or her opinion is respected and counts."5 The court
rejected the ill-conceived argument of the Guardian Ad Litem Program of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, which argued that the court ought not find that
the Baker Act procedures should be incorporated into the statutes, because
the dependency courts are so busy and lack time and resources to accomplish
the procedures that were already statutorily required. 55 The court explained
that although dependency courts are busy this does not mean that the court
could reject procedural rights of a child about to be placed in a residential
treatment facility against his or her wishes simply because there are other
hearings under chapter
39 and that additional hearings might somehow
159
burden the court.
The court concluded that while the Baker Act did not apply, in the
future there ought to be clear procedures prior to placement in a residential
treatment facility, which should include a hearing in which the child has a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.' 60 The court directed the Juvenile Court
Rules Committee to submit to the court proposed rules that
1 61 set forth
procedures to be followed in a residential mental health situation.
Although children have no right to counsel in dependency proceedings
in Florida, several years ago the Florida legislature made absolute the right
to counsel to parents in dependency proceedings providing that, if indigent,
parents are entitled to appointed counsel unless the indigent parent waives
that right. 162 The FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedurefollow the statute and
make explicit the procedure by which the court shall advise parents of the
right to counsel and determine whether there is a waiver of counsel. 163 In
D.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services,164 the trial court
blatantly failed to comply with these provisions and the appellate court
reversed.16 5 Among the trial court's failings were advising the parent at the
arraignment that she could either admit or deny the allegations in the petition
156. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 107-08.
157. ld. at 108.
158. Id.

159. Id.

160. Id. at 109.
161. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 109.
162. See FLA. STAT. § 39.013(9)(a) (2000).
163. See FLA. R. Juv.P. 8.320.
164. 750 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
165. id. at 130.

Published by NSUWorks, 2000

17

Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 4

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 25:91

and if she chose to deny them she would have the right to a lawyer. 166 At the
arraignment hearing, while determining that the mother was on medication,
the trial court only briefly mentioned the right to counsel which failed 1to
67
fulfill the duty to advise of the right to counsel and what the right entails.
The trial court also failed to determine whether the mother's waiver was
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.'6
At the shelter and
dispositional hearings, the problem was the court's failure to advise the
mother of a right to counsel at all.169 The appellate court reversed. 170
Chapter 39 provides for termination of jurisdiction in a dependency
case based upon the recommendation of the Department of Children and
Family Services or the guardian ad litem or based upon any other relevant
factors, once six months have passed since returning the child to the
parents. 171 In W.R. v. Department of Children & Families,172 despite the
recommendations of the guardian ad litem and the Department, the court
continued jurisdiction after six months had passed since the return of the
child to her parents. 173 In the W.R. case, nothing appeared on the record to
justify continued jurisdiction. 74 The appellate court recognized that it was
difficult to let go when one takes responsibility for a child's welfare.' 75
However, as the court put it, "our present legal system provides that under
normal circumstances (as have come to pass in this case), parents have both
the joy and
the burden of raising their children without interference from the
17 6
courts.',

Finally, in an important case of first impression, the Third District
Court of Appeal in M.C. v. Departmentof Children & Families,177 ruled that
the Americans With Disabilities Act
is inapplicable when used as a
defense by the parent in proceedings under chapter 39 related to

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 129.
See id.
Id. at 130.
M.C., 750 So. 2d at 130.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2000).
757 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

173. Id. at 606.
174. Id. at 606-07.

175.
176.
177.
178.

id. at 607.
Id.
750 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
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dependency. 179 In so doing, the court followed several other state courts
180
which had rejected the argument.

IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The current provision of chapter 39 governing termination of parental
rights contains nine separate grounds for termination including: 1) the
voluntary execution of a written surrender; 2) abandonment of the child and
the identity and location of parent is unknown despite a sixty-day diligent
search; 3) the existence of conduct toward the child demonstrating
continuing parental relationship threatens life, safety, well-being, or
physical, mental, or emotional health of the child despite services being
rendered; 4) the incarceration in a state or federal institution for a substantial
period of time before the child will reach the age of eighteen or the parent is
determined to be a violent career criminal; 5) the filing of a plan and the
child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned wherein the failure to
comply is for a period of twelve months or more after filing for dependency;
6) the parents are engaged in egregious conduct toward the child; 7) the
parents have subjected the child to aggravated sexual abuse; 8) the parents
have committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child or a
felonious assault involving serious bodily injury to the child; or 9) the
parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated
involuntarily. 81 The law is clear that the court must address the statutory
factors listed in section 39.806 of the FloridaStatutes."2
Furthermore, the court at the termination hearing shall consider what
the statute describes as the "manifest best interests of the child," and in
doing so shall consider eleven different factors.18 3 The court will then enter
a written order with the findings of facts and conclusions of law.184 In A.C.
v. Departmentof Children & Families,8 5 the appellate court was compelled

179. M.C., 750 So. 2d at 706 (discussing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West 1999)).
180. See Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d

8930 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999); A.P. v. State, 728 A.2d 375 (Pa. Super. CL 1999); In re B.K.F.,
704 So. 2d 314 (La. CL App. 1997); In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716 (Vt. CL App. 1997); Stone v.
Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d. 824 (Ind. CL App. 1995).
181.

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.806(1)(a)(I) (2000).

182. See id.
183. § 39.810.
184. § 39.809(5).
185. 751 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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to reverse because the final judgment failed to address the statutory 6factors
listed in the manifest best interests of the child section of the statute.18
Also in A.C., the court commented on a rather basic evidentiary
proposition. The court held that in conducting an adjudicatory hearing in a
termination case the trial court is required to abide by the rules of evidence
in civil cases and thus must receive admissible evidence prior to entry of a
final judgment terminating parental rights.18 7 The court is not permitted to
consider inadmissible
evidence in determining whether it shall terminate
88
parental rights.1
Termination of parental rights may not occur where a prior dependency

adjudication is deficient because a parent is not properly served with notice
of an arraignment hearing at which a default adjudication of dependency was
entered against the parent.18 9 In T.R.F. v. Department of Children &
Families,1 the problem was whether the failure to make a diligent search as

a predicate to determining that the parents' failure to appear at the
arraignment hearing may result in a default determination of dependency and

subsequent termination of parental rights. 191 Chapter 39 provides that an
affidavit of diligent search shall be filed where the parent's identity or
residence is unknown. 192 The court in T.R.F. explained that a diligent search
involves checking with the offices of the Department of Children and Family
Services that might have information about the parent, other state and federal
agencies that might have information, utility and postal providers, or

appropriate law enforcement agencies. 193

The same problem arose in S.N.S. v. Department of Children &
Families.194 An order terminating parental rights was reversed because the
record contained no evidence that the mother was served with notice of the
arraignment hearing at which a default adjudication of dependency was
entered. 195 In S.N.S., the trial court took into account the father's
representations regarding the mother's knowledge of the hearing and the
father's specific statement that the mother was aware of the hearing but was

186. Id. at 669 (citing
187. Id.
188. Id.

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.467(3) (1997)).

189. See T.R.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 741 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 2d Dist.

Ct. App. 1999).
190. 741 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
191. Id. at 1186.
192. FLA. STAT. § 39.502(8)-(9) (2000).
193. T.R.F., 741 So. 2d at 1186.
194. 750 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
195. Id. at 62.
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too embarrassed to attend. 196 Such oral notice, if it existed at all, was
insufficient to satisfy the Florida statute.197
V. STATUTORY CHANGES

A.

Dependency and Terminationof ParentalRights

The Florida legislature has changed the name and purpose of the
Department of Children and Family Services on a number of occasions over
the past twenty years. 198 This year is no different. The legislature has
changed the philosophical approach of the Department by moving to
privatization of the child welfare system through the use of profit making
entities to carry out many of the responsibilities of the Department.! The
key component of the new approach involves authorizing the Department of
Children and Family Services to contract for services with a lead agency in
each county. ° The obligations of the lead agency shall include: directing
and coordinating programs and services, including the provision of core
services involving intake and eligibility, assessment, service planning, and
case management; developing a service provider network that can develop
services contained in client service plans; managing and monitoring provider
contracts; developing and implementing effective bill payment mechanisms;
providing or arranging for the provision of administrative services to support
the service delivery scheme; employing department approved training and
meeting department defined credentials and standards; providing for
performance measurements in accordance with the department's quality
assurance program; developing and maintaining interagency collaboration;
insuring that all federal and state reporting requirements are met; operating
the consumer complaint and grievance process; and insuring that services are
coordinated. 2" The theory for the change in approach is one of free
enterprise competition described as a competitive procurement approach to
services.2

196. Id.

197. Id.
198. See 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 193-94; Juvenile Law Issues, supra note 28, at
828-30; 1997Survey, supra note 2, at 205-06; 1995 Survey, supranote 2, at 217-19.
199. See Ch. 2000-139, § 2, 2000 Fla. Laws 306, 310 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.19
(2000)).
200. Id. at 315 (codified at RA. STAT. § 20.19 (2000)).
201. Id.
202. See id. § 7,2000 Fla. Laws at 320-24 (codified at FLA. STAT.
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The second significant change has been the transfer of responsibility to
perform child protective
20 3 investigations to the sheriffs of Pasco, Manatee, and
now Broward County.
In an effort to clarify court jurisdiction when dependency proceedings
and custody and/or divorce proceedings are pending at the same time, the
legislature amended section 39.013 of the Florida Statutes to include a
provision that when there are dissolution or other proceedings involving
custody or visitation of a child pending at the same time as a4 dependency
proceeding, the dependency proceeding shall take precedence. W
The legislature passed a narrowly focused bill aimed at providing
attorneys ad litem to children in dependency cases in Orange County on a
test basis. 0 5 The legislature determined that in light of the declaration of
goals for dependent children contained in the statute, a pilot program for
attorneys ad litem for dependent children who are in out-of-home care by
court order was to be put in place so the children received competent
representation. 2 0' It set up the program in the Ninth Judicial Circuit, which
encompasses Orlando.207 Under the provisions of the statute, the circuit
court contracts with a private or public entity to establish the private
program which would represent the rights of children taken into custody by
the Department.2 s The Office of State Courts sets measurable outcomes for
the program and the court designates an attorney to conduct administrative
oversight of the program. 20 9
The statute, while quite limited in scope geographically as well as in
purpose, is significant because Florida does not provide for counsel to
children in dependency cases. 210 Furthermore, while Florida receives funds
pursuant to federal legislation for child welfare purposes,21 the state of
Florida does not provide guardians ad litem for children in all cases as
212
required by the federal statute.
Indeed, Florida has not reported to the
203. Id. § 3, 2000 Fla. Laws at 316-18 (codified at FA. STAT. § 39.3065 (2000)).
204. Ch. 2000-139, § 16, 2000 Fla. Laws 306, 336 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.013

(2000)).
205. Id. § 88, 2000 Fla. Laws at 389 (codified at FlA. STAT. § 39.4086 (2000)).
206. Id. (codified at § 39.4086(1) (2000)).
207. Id. at 390 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.4086(2)(a) (2000)).
208. Id. (codified at F.A. STAT. § 39.4086(2)(b) (2000)).
209. Ch. 2000-139, § 88, 2000 Fla. Laws 306, 390 (codified at EtA. STAT.
§ 39.4086(2)(b) (2000)).
210. See D.B. v. State, 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980); Brevard County v. Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs., 589 So. 2d 398,400 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
211. See Childhood Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA"), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5119 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
212. See infra notes 214 and 215.
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federal government on compliance 2 13 and contact with the Guardian Ad
Litem Program in Broward County demonstrates that children are provided
cases. 214
with guardians ad litem in less than fifty percent of the
Furthermore, there is a body of case law in the State of Florida holding that
the federal
children do not receive counsel in all cases and, despite
215 "

legislation, that they are not entitled to guardians ad litem.

B.

Juvenile Delinquency

The legislature made several changes in the juvenile delinquency field
including a well-deserved change in terminology from the term "community
control" to "probation," thus bringing Florida in line with most other
states. 2 6 The legislature also expanded the use of pretrial detention for
juveniles again.21 It amended chapter 985 to provide for a period of up to

seventy-two hours of prehearing detention for a child who is detained for
failure to appear and who has previously willfully failed to appear after

proper notice of the adjudicatory hearinE on the same case regardless of the
result of the risk assessment instrument. 8 The legislature also provided for
detention for up to seventy-two hours for willful failure to appear at two or

more court hearings of any nature with seventy-two hour detention
resulting.2, 9

In addition, the legislature extended the time for pretrial extension for
good cause shown to an additional nine days when the child is charged with

an offense which, if committed as an adult, would be a capital felony, life
213. See Summary Data Component Survey 1998, Department of Children and Family
Services.
214. Telephone Conversation with Jeanette Wagner and Melissa Solomon, Esq.,
Broward County Guardian Ad Litem Program. On November 9, 2000, the circuit court in
Broward County had assigned 1341 cases to the local office of the guardian ad litem. Of that
number, the office was able to assign 831 guardians or 62%.
215. See Fisher v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 674 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); E.F. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 639 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1994); 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 190-91; Juvenile Law Issues, supra note 28, at 824-25;
1997 Survey, supranote 2, at 209.
216. See Ch. 2000-135, § 18, 2000 Fla. Laws 209, 232 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 985.03(43)).
217. See generally 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 180; Juvenile Law Issues, supra note
28, at 831-34; 1997 Survey, supra note 2, at 180-84; 1992 Survey, supra note 2, at 348-53;
1991 Survey, supra note 124, at 339-43.
218. See Ch. 2000-134, § 9, 2000 Fla. Laws 197, 204 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 985.215(2)(i) (2000)).
219. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.215(2)j) (2000)).
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felony, felony
of the first degree, or felony of the second degree involving
22
violence. 0
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida heard just a few cases involving
children's issues, but rendered a major opinion establishing certain
procedural due process rights for children who are in the child welfare
system as dependents and who are to be placed in mental health residential
facilities. Lower appellate courts ruled on diverse issues in both the
delinquency and the child welfare fields upholding constitutional rights of
children and strictly enforcing statutory protections for both children and
their families.
The legislature put into effect a dramatic change in the focus of the
child welfare system in Florida by authorizing the Department of Children
and Family Services to contract with profit making entities to take over
responsibility for major portions of the child welfare system.

220. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.215(5)(f) (2000)).
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